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Today’s schools must offer a rigorous academic curriculum to prepare students for the rising skill 
demands of the modern economy (Levy and Murnane, 2004). Yet at least since the publication of A 
Nation at Risk in 1983, policymakers have acted on the principle that America’s schools are failing. The 
ambitious and far-reaching No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 (NCLB) identified test-based accountability 
as the key to improved school performance. NCLB mandates that states conduct annual standardized 
assessments in math and reading, that schools’ average performance on assessments be publicized, and 
that rewards and sanctions be doled out to schools on the basis of their students’ performance on the 
exams.  
However, more than a decade after the passage of NCLB, we know very little about the impact of 
test-based accountability on students’ long-run life chances. Previous work has found large gains on 
high-stakes tests, with some evidence of smaller gains on low-stakes exams that is inconsistent across 
grades and subjects (e.g. Koretz and Barron 1998, Linn 2000, Klein et al. 2000, Carnoy and Loeb 2002, 
Hanushek and Raymond 2005, Jacob 2005, Wong, Cook and Steiner 2009, Dee and Jacob 2010, Reback, 
Rockoff and Schwartz 2011). There are many studies of strategic responses to accountability pressure, 
ranging from focusing instruction on marginal students, narrow test content and coaching, manipulating 
the pool of accountable students, boosting the nutritional content of school lunches, and teacher 
cheating (Haney 2000, McNeil and Valenzuela 2001, Jacob and Levitt 2003, Diamond and Spillane 2004, 
Figlio and Winicki 2005, Booher-Jennings 2005, Jacob 2005, Cullen and Reback 2006, Figlio and Getzler 
2006, Vasquez Heilig and Darling-Hammond 2008, Reback 2008, Neal and Schanzenbach 2010).   
When do improvements on high-stakes tests represent real learning gains? And when do they make 
students better off in the long-run? The main difficulty in interpreting accountability-induced student 
achievement gains is that once a measure becomes the basis of assessing performance, it loses its 
diagnostic value (Campbell 1976, Kerr 1995, Neal 2013). Previous research has focused on measuring 
performance on low-stakes exams, yet academic achievement is only one of many possible ways that 
teachers and schools may affect students (Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff 2012, Jackson 2012).  
While there are many goals of public schooling, test-based accountability is premised on the belief 
that student achievement gains will lead to long-run improvements in important life outcomes such as 
educational attainment and earnings. High-stakes testing creates incentives for teachers and schools to 
adjust their effort toward improving test performance in the short-run. Whether these changes make 
students better off in the long-run depends critically on the correlation between the actions that schools 
take to raise test scores, and the resulting changes in earnings and educational attainment at the margin 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991, Baker 1992, Hout et al., 2011).  3 
 
In this paper we examine the long-run impact of test-based accountability in Texas public high 
schools. We use data from the Texas Schools Project, which links PK-12 records from all public schools in 
Texas to data on college attendance, degree completion and labor market earnings in their state. Texas 
implemented high-stakes accountability in 1993, and high school students in the mid to late 1990s are 
now old enough to examine outcomes in young adulthood. High schools were rated by the share of 10
th 
grade students who received passing scores on exit exams in math, reading and writing. Schools were 
assigned an overall rating based on the pass rate of the lowest scoring test-subgroup combination (e.g 
math for whites), giving some schools strong incentives to focus on particular students, subjects and 
grade cohorts. School ratings were published in full page spreads in local newspapers, and schools that 
were rated as Low-Performing were forced to undergo an evaluation that could lead to serious 
consequences such as layoffs, reconstitution and/or school closure (TEA 1994, Haney 2000, Cullen and 
Reback 2006).  
Our empirical strategy compares students within the same school, but across cohorts which faced 
different degrees of accountability pressure. Variation in accountability pressure arises because of 
changes in the ratings thresholds over time, as well as changes in the 8
th grade test scores and 
demographics of each school’s incoming 9
th grade cohort. The focus on grade cohorts is possible 
because high schools gave high-stakes tests only in 10
th grade. Our results are valid causal estimates of 
the impact of accountability pressure only if changes in predicted accountability pressure across grade 
cohorts in a high school are uncorrelated (conditional on covariates) with unobserved factors that also 
affect 10
th grade scores and long-run outcomes. We test this assumption in a variety of ways, such as 
investigating trends in time-varying resources and pre-accountability test scores by school and 
subgroup. We conduct falsification tests using test scores at younger ages. We also estimate a 
specification that only uses policy variation in the passing standard for identification. Our results are 
robust to these specification checks, as well as to alternative sample restrictions and definitions of 
accountability pressure. 
We find that students score significantly higher on the 10
th grade math exam when they are in a 
grade cohort that is at risk of receiving a Low-Performing rating. These impacts are larger for students 
with low baseline achievement. Later in life, these students are more likely to attend and graduate from 
a four-year college, and they have higher earnings at age 25. We also find greater gains for poor and 
minority students with low baseline achievement, whose scores are most likely to “count” toward a 
higher accountability rating. However, schools that were close to receiving a rating above the  
“Acceptable” threshold (called “Recognized”) responded differently. Instead of improving math 4 
 
achievement, they classified more low-scoring students as eligible for special education and thus 
exempt from the “accountable” pool of test-takers. Perhaps as a consequence, we find relatively large 
declines in educational attainment and earnings among low-scoring students in these schools.  
We find that accountability pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating leads to increases in labor 
market earnings at age 25 of around 1 percent. This is similar in size to the impact of having a teacher 
with 1 standard deviation higher “value-added”, and it lines up reasonably well with cross-sectional 
estimates of the impact of test score gains on young adult earnings (Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff 2012; 
Neal and Johnson 1996, Currie and Thomas 2001, Chetty et al 2011). We also find impacts on math 
course credit accumulation that mirror both the positive and negative impacts of accountability 
pressure, which is consistent with changes in mathematics coursework or knowledge as a plausible 
mechanism (Levine and Zimmerman 1995, Rose and Betts 2004, Goodman 2012). Broadly, our results 
indicate that school accountability led to long-run gains for students in schools that were at risk of falling 
below a minimum performance standard. Efforts to regulate school quality at a higher level (through the 
achievement of a Recognized rating), however, did not benefit students and may have caused long-run 
harm.  
The accountability system adopted by Texas in 1993 was similar in many respects to the 
requirements of NCLB, which was enacted nine years later. NCLB required that states rate schools based 
on the share of students who pass standardized exams. It also required states to report subgroup test 
results, and to increase testing standards over time. Thus our findings may have broad applicability to 
the accountability regimes that were rolled out in other states over this period. Nonetheless, we caution 
that our results are specific to a particular time period, state and grade level. Because we compare 
schools that face different degrees of pressure within the same high-stakes testing regime, our study 
explicitly differences out any common trend in outcomes caused by school accountability. We estimate 
the net impact of schools’ responses along a variety of margins, including focusing on “bubble” students 
and subjects, teaching to the test, and manipulating the eligible test-taking pool. Our results do not 
imply that these strategic responses do not occur, or that school accountability in Texas was optimally 
designed (Neal 2013). 
 
   5 
 
I.  Background 
Beginning in the early 1990s, a handful of states such as Texas and North Carolina implemented 
“consequential” school accountability policies, where school performance on standardized tests was not 
only made public but also tied to rewards and sanctions (Carnoy and Loeb 2002, Hanushek and 
Raymond 2005, Dee and Jacob 2010, Figlio and Loeb 2011). The number of states with some form of 
school accountability rose from 5 in 1994 to 36 in 2000, and scores on high-stakes tests rose rapidly in 
states that were early adopters of school accountability (Hanushek and Raymond 2005, Figlio and Ladd 
2007, Figlio and Loeb 2011). Under then Governor and future President George W. Bush, test-based 
accountability in Texas served as a template for the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2002.  
NCLB mandated annual reading and math testing in grades 3 through 8 and at least once in high school, 
and required states to rate schools on the basis of test performance overall and for key subgroups, and 
to sanction schools that failed to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward state goals (e.g. 
Hanushek and Raymond 2005).  
Figure 1 shows pass rates on the 8
th and 10
th grade reading and mathematics exams for successive 
cohorts of first-time 9
th graders in Texas. Pass rates on the 8
th grade math exam rose from about 58 
percent in the 1994 cohort to 91 percent in the 2000 cohort, only six years later. Similarly, pass rates on 
the 10
th grade exam, which was a high-stakes exit exam for students, rose from 57 percent to 78 
percent, with smaller yet still sizable gains in reading. This rapid rise in pass rates has been referred to in 
the literature as the “Texas miracle” (Klein et al 2000, Haney 2000).  
The interpretation of the “Texas miracle” is complicated by studies of strategic responses to high-
stakes testing. Past research on the impact of high-stakes accountability on low-stakes test performance 
has found that scores on high-stakes tests improve, often dramatically, whereas performance on a low-
stakes test with different format but similar content improves only slightly or not at all, a phenomenon 
known as “score inflation” (Koretz et al 1991, Koretz and Barron 1998, Linn 2000, Klein et al 2000, Jacob 
2005). Researchers studying the implementation of accountability in Texas and other settings have 
found evidence that schools raised test scores by retaining low-performing students in 9
th grade, 
classifying them as eligible for special education or otherwise exempt from taking the exam, and 
encouraging them to drop out (Haney 2000, McNeil and Valenzuela 2001, Jacob 2005, Cullen and 
Reback 2006, Figlio 2006, Figlio and Getzler 2006, Vasquez Heilig and Darling-Hammond 2008, McNeil et 
al 2008, Jennings and Beveridge 2009).  
Performance standards that use short-run, quantifiable measures are often subject to distortion 
(Kerr 1975, Campbell 1976). As in the multi-task moral hazard models of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) 6 
 
and Baker (1992), performance incentives cause teachers and schools to adjust their effort toward the 
least costly ways of increasing test scores, at the expense of actions that do not increase test scores but 
that may be important for students’ long-run welfare. In the context of school accountability, the 
concern is that schools will focus on short-run improvements in test performance at the expense of 
higher-order learning, creativity, self-motivation, socialization and other important skills that are related 
to the long-run success of students. The key insight from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker 
(1992) is that the value of performance incentives depends on the correlation between a performance 
measure (high-stakes tests) and true productivity (attainment, earnings) at the margin (Hout et al, 
2011). In other words, when schools face accountability pressure, what is the correlation between the 
actions that they take to raise test scores and the resulting changes in attainment, earnings and other 
long-run outcomes?
2 
The literature on school accountability has focused on low-stakes tests, in an attempt to measure 
whether gains on high-stakes exams represent generalizable gains in student learning. Recent studies of 
accountability in multiple states have found achievement gains across subjects and grades on low-stakes 
exams (Ladd 1999, Carnoy and Loeb 2002, Greene and Winters 2003, Hanushek and Raymond 2005, 
Figlio and Rouse 2006, Chiang 2009, Dee and Jacob 2010, Wong, Cook and Steiner 2011, Allen and 
Burgess 2012).
3  
Yet scores on low-stakes exams may miss important dimensions of responses to test pressure. Other 
studies of accountability have found that schools narrow their curriculum and instructional practices in 
order to raise scores on the high-stakes exam, at the expense of low-stakes subjects, students, and 
grade cohorts (Stecher et al 2000, Diamond and Spillane 2004, Booher-Jennings 2005, Hamilton et al 
2005, Jacob 2005, Diamond 2007, Hamilton et al 2007, Reback 2008, Neal and Schanzenbach 2010, 
Lauen and Ladd 2010, Reback, Rockoff and Schwartz 2011, Dee and Jacob 2012). Increasing achievement 
is only one of many possible ways that schools and teachers may affect students (Chetty, Friedman and 
Rockoff 2012, Jackson 2012). Studies of early life and school-age interventions often find long-term 
impacts on outcomes despite “fade out” or non-existence of test score gains (Gould et al 2004, Belfield 
                                                           
2 For example, suppose some schools were not teaching students very much at all prior to accountability. It could 
simultaneously be true that while these schools are engaging in a variety of strategic behaviors, students are nonetheless better 
off in the long-run. On the other hand, if these schools were already doing a good job prior to accountability, perhaps because 
they already felt accountable to parents, test-based accountability could lead purely to a wasteful increase in compliance 
behavior, with no long-run impact on students or even negative impacts. The key point is that the existence of strategic 
behavior, and the variety of margins along which schools adjust, tells us very little about the net impact of accountability on 
students’ long-run outcomes. 
3 The balance of the evidence suggests that gains from accountability are generally larger in math than in reading, and are 
concentrated among schools and students at the lower end of the achievement distribution (Carnoy and Loeb 2002, Jacob 
2005, Figlio and Rouse 2006, Ladd and Lauen 2010, Figlio and Loeb 2011). 7 
 
et al 2006, Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2006, Kemple and Willner 2008, Booker et al 2009, Deming 2009, 
Chetty et al 2011, Deming 2011, Deming, Hastings, Kane and Staiger 2013).  
A few studies have examined the impact of accountability in Texas on high school dropout, with 
inconclusive findings (e.g. Haney 2000, Carnoy, Loeb and Smith 2001, Mcneil et al 2008, Vasquez Heilig 
and Darling-Hammond 2008). To our knowledge, only two studies look at the long-term impact of school 
accountability on postsecondary outcomes. Wong (2008) compares the earnings of cohorts with 
differential exposure to school accountability across states and over time using the Census and ACS, and 
finds inconsistent impacts. Donovan, Figlio and Rush (2006) find that minimum competency 
accountability systems reduce college performance among high-achieving students, but that more 
demanding accountability systems improve college performance in mathematics courses. Neither of 
these studies asks whether schools that respond to accountability pressure by increasing students’ test 
scores also make those students more likely to attend and complete college, to earn more as adults, or 
to benefit over the long-run in other important ways.  
II.  Data 
The Texas Schools Project (TSP) at the University of Texas-Dallas maintains administrative records 
for every student who has attended a public school in the state of Texas. Students are tracked 
longitudinally from pre-kindergarten through 12
th grade with a unique student identifier, and their 
records include scores on high-stakes exams in math, reading and writing, as well as measures of 
attendance, graduation, transfer and dropout. From 1994 to 2003, state exams were referred to as the 
Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS). Students were tested in reading and math in grades 3 
through 8 and again in grade 10, with writing exams also administered in grades 4, 8 and 10. Raw test 
scores were scaled using the Texas Learning Index (TLI), which was intended to facilitate comparisons 
across test administrations. For each year and grade, students are considered to have passed the exam if 
they reach a TLI score of 70 or greater. As we discuss in more detail in the next section, schools were 
rated based on the percentage of students who receive a passing score. After each exam, the test 
questions are released to the public, and the content of the TAAS remained mostly unchanged from 
1994 to 1999 (e.g. Klein et al 2000). 
High school students were required to pass each of the 10
th grade exams to graduate from high 
school. The mathematics content on the TAAS exit exam was relatively basic – one analysis found that it 
was at approximately an 8
th grade level compared to national standards (Stotsky 1999). Students who 
passed the TAAS exit exam in mathematics often struggled to pass end-of-course exams in Algebra I (e.g. 8 
 
Haney 2000). Students were allowed up to eight chances to retake the exam between the spring of the 
10
th grade year and the end of 12th grade (Martorell and Clark 2010). Due to the number of allowed 
retakes, and the fact that retakes were often scaled and administered differently, we primarily use 
students’ scores from the first time they take the 10
th grade exams. We also create an indicator variable 
equal to one if a student first took the test at the usual time for their 9
th grade cohort. This helps us test 
for the possibility that schools might increase pass rates by strategically retaining, exempting or 
reclassifying students whom they expect might fail the exam. Since the TSP data cover the entire state, 
we can measure graduation from any public school in the state of Texas, even if a student transfers 
several times, but we cannot track students who left the state. 
The TSP links PK-12 records to postsecondary attendance and graduation data from the Texas 
Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB). The THECB data contain records of enrollment, course-
taking and matriculation for all students who attended public institutions in the state of Texas. In 2003, 
the THECB began collecting similar information from private not-for-profit colleges in Texas.
4 While the 
TSP data do not contain information about out-of-state college enrollment, less than 9 percent of 
graduating seniors in Texas who attend college do so out of state, and they are mostly high-scoring 
students.
5 Our main postsecondary outcomes are whether the student ever attended a four-year college 
or received a bachelor’s degree from any public or private institution in Texas.
6  
The TSP has also linked PK-12 records to quarterly earnings data for 1990-2010 from the Texas 
Workforce Commission (TWC). The TWC data covers wage earnings for nearly all formal employment. 
Importantly, students who drop out of high school prior to graduation are covered in the TWC data, as 
long as they are employed in the state of Texas. Our main outcomes of interest here are annual earnings 
in the age 23-25 years (i.e. the full calendar years that begin 9 to 11 years after the student’s first year in 
9
th grade). Since the earnings data are available through 2010, we can measure earnings in the age 25 
year for the 1995 through 1999 9
th grade cohorts.  We also construct indicator variables for having any 
positive earnings in the age 19-25 years and over the seven years combined. Zero positive earnings 
could indicate a true lack of labor force participation, or that employment in another state.  
                                                           
4 The addition of new postsecondary data in 2003 causes some cohort differences in base attendance and degree completion 
rates. However, the inclusion of year fixed effects in our analysis should difference out any overall cohort trends in college 
attendance, including those that result from differences in data coverage. Still, as a check, we rerun our main results with only 
public institutions included and find very similar results. 
5 Authors’ calculation based on a match of 2 graduating classes (2008 and 2009) in the TSP data to the National Student 
Clearinghouse (NSC), a nationwide database of college attendance. 
6 Our youngest cohort of students (9
th graders in Spring 2001) had 7 years after their expected high school graduation date to 
attend college and complete a BA. While a small number of students in the earlier cohorts received a BA after year 7, almost 
none attended a four-year college for the first time after 7 years. Attendance and degree receipt at 2-year college after that 
time was considerably more common, which is one reason that we focus on four-year colleges in our main analysis. 9 
 
We augment the TSP data with archival records of school and subgroup-specific exit exam pass rates 
from the pre-accountability period, back to 1991.
7 These data allow us to test for differential pre-
accountability trends at the school and subgroup level. 
Our analysis sample consists of five cohorts of first-time 9
th grade students from Spring 1995 to 
Spring 1999. The TSP data begin in the 1993-1994 school year, and we need 8
th grade test scores for our 
analysis. The first cohort with 8
th grade scores began in the 1994-1995 school year. Our last cohort 
began high school in 1998-1999 and took the 10
th grade exam in 1999-2000. We use these five cohorts 
because Texas’ accountability system was relatively stable between 1994 and 1999, and because long-
run outcome data are unavailable for later cohorts.  
We assign students to a cohort based on the first time they enter 9
th grade. We assign them to the 
first school that lists them in the six week enrollment records provided to the TEA. Prior work has 
documented the many ways that schools in Texas could manipulate the pool of “accountable” students 
to achieve a higher rating (Haney 2000, McNeil and Valenzuela 2001, Cullen and Reback 2006, Jennings 
and Beveridge 2009). Our solution is to assign students to the first high school they attend and to 
measure outcomes based on this initial assignment. For example, if a student attends School A in 9
th 
grade, transfers to School B in 10
th grade and then graduates, she is counted as graduating from School 
A.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our overall analysis sample, and by race and 8
th grade test 
scores. The sample is about 14 percent African-American and 34 percent Latino. 38 percent of students 
are eligible for free or reduced price lunch (meaning their family income is less than 185 percent of the 
Federal poverty line). About 76 percent of all students, 59 percent of blacks and 67 percent of Latinos 
pass the 10
th grade math exam on the first try (roughly 20 months after entering 9
th grade). There is a 
strong relationship between 8
th grade and 10
th grade pass rates. Only 40 percent of students who failed 
an 8
th grade exam passed the 10
th grade math exam on the first try, and only 62 percent ever passed the 
10
th grade math exam. In contrast, over 90 percent of students who passed both of their 8
th grade exams 
also passed the 10
th grade math exam, and almost all did so on the first try.  
III.  Policy Context  
Figure 2 summarizes the key Texas accountability indicators and standards from 1995 to 2002. 
Schools were grouped into one of four possible performance categories – Low-Performing, Acceptable, 
                                                           
7 We obtained these records by pulling them off the TEA website, where they are posted in .html format. School codes and 
subgroup pass rates allow us to clean the data and merge them onto the TSP records. 10 
 
Recognized and Exemplary.  Schools and districts were assigned performance grades based on the 
overall share of students that passed TAAS exams in reading, writing and mathematics, as well as 
attendance and high school dropout. Indicators were also calculated separately for 4 key subgroups - 
White, African-American, Hispanic, and Economically Disadvantaged (based on the Federal free lunch 
eligibility standard for poverty) – but only if the group constituted at least 10 percent of the school’s 
population.  
Beginning in 1995, schools received the overall rating ascribed to their lowest performing indicator-
subgroup combination. This meant that high schools could be held accountable for as many as 5 
measures by 4 subgroups = 20 total performance indicators. The TAAS passing standard for a school to 
receive an Acceptable rating rose by 5 percentage points every year, from 25 percent in 1995 to 50 
percent in 2000. The standard for a Recognized rating also rose, from 70 percent in 1995 and 1996 to 75 
percent in 1997, and 80 percent from 1998 onward. In contrast, the dropout and attendance rate 
standards remained constant over the period we study. The details of the rating system mean that math 
scores were almost always the main obstacle to improving a school’s rating.
8 The lowest subgroup-
indicator was a math score in over 90 percent of cases. Since schools received a rating based on the 
lowest scoring subgroup, racially and economically diverse schools often faced significant accountability 
pressure even if they had high overall pass rates.
9  
Schools had strong incentives to respond to accountability pressure. School ratings were made 
public, published in full page spreads in local newspapers, and displayed prominently inside and outside 
of school buildings (Haney 2000, Cullen and Reback 2006). School accountability ratings have been 
shown to affect property values and private donations to schools (Figlio and Lucas 2004, Figlio and 
Kenny 2009, Imberman and Lovenheim 2013). Additionally, school districts received an accountability 
rating based on their lowest-rated school – thus Low-Performing schools faced informal pressure to 
improve from the district-wide bureaucracy. Schools rated as Low-Performing were also forced to 
                                                           
8 Schools that achieved 25 percent pass rates on the TAAS received Acceptable ratings even if they failed the attendance and 
dropout provisions. Moreover, dropouts were counted “affirmatively” so that students who simply disappeared from the high 
school did not count against the rating. This led to unrealistically low dropout rates (e.g. Haney 2000, Vasquez Heilig and 
Darling-Hammond 2008).  
9 Appendix Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for high schools by the accountability ratings they received over our sample 
period. About 30 percent of schools received a Low-Performing rating at least once in five years, while 40 percent of schools 
were rated Acceptable in all five years. Not surprisingly, schools that received higher ratings (Recognized or Exemplary) had 
very few minority students and had high average test scores. Appendix Figure A1 displays the importance of subgroup pressure 
by plotting each school’s overall pass rate on the 10
th grade math exam against the math rate for the lowest-scoring subgroup 
in that school, for the 1995 and 1999 cohorts. The often large distance from the 45 degree line shows that some schools have 
high overall pass rates yet still face pressure because of low scores among particular subgroups. Note that the disparity 
between school-wide and subgroup pass rates (reflected by the slope of the dashed lines in each picture) shrinks over time, 
suggesting that lower-scoring subgroups improve relatively more in later years.   11 
 
undergo an evaluation process that carried potentially serious consequences, such as allowing students 
to transfer out, firing school leadership, and reconstituting or closing the school (TEA 1994, Cullen and 
Reback 2006). Although the most punitive sanctions were rarely used, dismissal or transfer of teachers 
and principals in Low-Performing schools was somewhat more common (Evers and Walberg 2002, 
Lemons, Luschei and Siskin 2004, Mintrop and Trujillo 2005). 
In many ways, the Texas accountability system was the template for the Federal No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2002. NCLB incorporated most of the main features of the Texas system, including 
reporting and rating schools based on exam pass rates, reporting requirements and increased focus on 
performance among poor and minority students, and rising standards over time. Some other states, 
particularly in the South, began implementing Texas-style provisions in the 1990s. When NCLB passed, 
45 states already published report cards on schools and 27 rated or identified low-performing schools 
(Figlio and Loeb 2011). Accountability policies have changed somewhat since 2002, with a handful of 
states moving toward test score growth models (using a “value-added” approach). However, these 
changes require a Federal waiver of NCLB requirements. 26 states currently have high school exit exams. 
Approximately 18 states had such exams during the period covered by our study, with Texas falling 
roughly in the middle in terms of the exams’ difficulty (Dee and Jacob 2007, Education Week 2012). 
IV.  Empirical Strategy  
Our empirical strategy hinges on three critical facts about school accountability in Texas. First, 
schools faced strong incentives to improve TAAS pass rates, particularly in math. Since the passing 
standard required to avoid a Low-Performing rating rose by five percentage points per year from 1995 
to 2000, even schools that were far from the threshold in earlier years often faced pressure in later 
years. Second, in any given year, schools could receive an Acceptable rating for a wide range of possible 
pass rates (e.g. between 30 and 70 percent in 1996, between 45 and 80 percent in 1999). This suggests 
that schools might feel more “safe” in some years than others, depending on the baseline levels of 
achievement in particular cohorts. Third, the policy of assigning ratings based on the lowest scoring 
subgroup created strong incentives for schools to focus on improving the test scores of poor and 
minority students with low baseline levels of achievement.
10  
                                                           
10 Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) find that high-stakes testing in Chicago led to increases in scores for “bubble” students in the 
middle of the prior test score distribution, but found no gains for the lowest-scoring students. However, only 6 percent of 
students in the bottom decile in Chicago passed the exam the following year. In our data, more than 20 percent of students in 
the bottom decile of the 8
th grade math exam still passed the 10
th grade exam. For this reason, we do not distinguish between 
low-scoring students and “bubble” students. 12 
 
Our identification strategy uses these policy details to compare similar students in schools and 
cohorts that faced differing degrees of accountability pressure. In particular, we hypothesize that 
schools feel less pressure to increase achievement when the lowest-scoring subgroup is very likely to 
land in the middle of the “Acceptable” range. Moreover, we can use the yearly variation in passing 
standards to make within-school, across-cohort comparisons. The key challenge is modeling the 
accountability pressure faced by high schools in each year.  
We develop a specification that predicts the share of students in a grade cohort and subgroup that 
will pass the 10
th grade exit exam, using students’ demographics and achievement prior to high school.  
Our approach is similar in spirit to Reback, Rockoff and Schwartz (2011), who compare students across 
schools that faced differential accountability pressure because of variation in state standards. We follow 
their approach in constructing subgroup and subject specific pass rate predictions based on measures of 
prior achievement.
11  
We begin by estimating logistic regressions of indicator variables for passing each of the 10
th grade 
exit exams on demographic characteristics, fully interacted with a third order polynomial in 8
th grade 
reading and math scores, using the full analysis sample. We also include year fixed effects in each 
model, which explicitly differences out common yearly trends in prior student achievement. We then 
aggregate these individual predictions up to the school-subgroup-test level to estimate the “risk” that 
schools will receive a particular rating. Our calculation of the school rating prediction proceeds in three 
steps: 
1.  We form mean pass rates and standard errors at the year-school-subgroup-test subject level, using 
the predicted values from the student level regressions discussed above.  
2.  Using the yearly ratings thresholds, we integrate over the distribution of test-by-subgroup pass 
rates to get predicted accountability ratings for each subgroup and test within a school and year. 
3.  Finally, since Texas’ accountability rating system specifies an overall school rating that is based on 
the lowest subgroup-test pass rate, we can multiply the conditional probabilities for each subgroup 
and test together to get a distribution of possible ratings at the school level.
12
 
13 
                                                           
11 The main differences between our prediction model and theirs are 1) we use individual student data rather than school-year 
aggregates; 2) their policy variation is across states, while ours is within the same state across different years. 
12 Consider the following example for a particular high school and year. Based on the predicted pass rates on the 10
th grade 
mathematics exam in math, reading and writing for each of the 4 rated subgroups, we calculate that white students have a 96.3 
percent chance of receiving an A rating and a 3.7 percent chance of receiving an R rating. Black students have an 18.8 percent 
chance of receiving an LP rating and an 81.2 percent chance of receiving an A rating. Latinos have a 4.7 percent chance of 
receiving an LP rating and a 95.3 percent chance for an A rating. Economically Disadvantaged students have an 11.3 percent 
chance of receiving an LP rating and an 88.7 percent chance for an A rating. Since only whites have any chance of getting an R, 
and the rating is based on the lowest rated subgroup and test, the conditional probability of an R is zero. The probability of an A 13 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the calculation is entirely ex ante – that is, it is based only the 8
th 
grade characteristics of first-time 9
th grade students in each cohort. It is not intended to predict the 
school’s actual accountability rating. Rather, we think of it as modeling a process in which high schools 
observe the demographic composition and academic skills of their incoming 9
th grade cohorts, make a 
prediction about how close they will be to the boundary between two ratings categories, and decides on 
a set of actions that they hope will achieve a higher rating. Thus, we are modeling the school’s 
perception of accountability pressure rather than constructing an accurate prediction. For example, if 
our model predicts that a school is very likely to receive a Low Performing rating but it ends up with an 
Acceptable rating, this might be because the school is particularly effective overall, or that it responded 
to accountability pressure by increasing student achievement.  
Appendix Figure A2 compares our predicted ratings to the actual ratings received by each school in 
each year. Among schools in the highest risk quintile for a Low-Performing rating, about 40 percent 
actually receive the Low-Performing rating, and this share declines smoothly as the predicted probability 
decreases. Appendix Table A2 presents a transition matrix that shows the relationship between schools’ 
predicted ratings in year T and year T+1. In any given year, almost half of all schools have an estimated 
100 percent risk of being rated Acceptable. We refer to these schools as “safe”. About 63 percent of the 
schools that are “safe” in year T are also “safe” in year T+1. 26 percent have some estimated risk of 
being rated Low-Performing the following year. The remaining 11 percent are close to achieving a 
Recognized rating. Thus, while ratings in one year predict the following year with some accuracy, there 
is plenty of year-to-year variation in predicted ratings across cohorts in the same school.  
Our main results come from regressions of the form: 
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rating is equal to the probability that all subgroups rate A or higher, which is (0.963+0.037)*(0.812)*(0.953)*(0.887) = 0.766. 
The probability of an LP rating is equal to 1 minus the summed probabilities of receiving each higher rating, which in this case is 
1-0.766 = 0.234. This calculation is conducted separately for all 3 tests to arrive at an overall probability, although in most cases 
math is the only relevant test since scores are so much lower than reading and writing. 
13 We follow the minimum size requirements outlined by accountability policy and exclude subgroups that are less than 10 
percent of the 9
th grade cohort in this calculation. We also incorporate into the model a provision known as Required 
Improvement, which allows schools to avoid receiving a Low-Performing rating if the year-to-year increase in the pass rate was 
large enough to put them on pace to reach a target of 50 percent within 5 years. Appendix Table A3 shows that the results are 
very similar when we use a simpler prediction model that only controls for the polynomial in 8
th grade scores, and does not 
explicitly model the Required Improvement provision. Schools could also receive higher ratings after the fact through appeals 
and waivers, and we do not model this explicitly 14 
 
We examine the impact of accountability pressure on outcomes   for student   in 8
th grade math 
score in school   and grade cohort  . Equation 2 allows the impact to vary by an indicator   for whether 
a student failed a prior 8
th grade exam in either math or reading. Our main independent variables of 
interest are indicators for being in a school and grade cohort that has some positive probability being 
rated Low Performing or Recognized/Exemplary, with a (rounded) 100 percent probability of an 
Acceptable rating as the left-out category. Note that the probabilities come directly out of the 
procedure described above, and as such they should not be thought of as a school’s actual probability of 
receiving a rating – we refer to these calculations from here onward as the “risk” of receiving a 
particular rating. The   vector includes controls for a third order polynomial in students’ 8
th grade 
reading and math scores plus demographic covariates such as race, gender and eligibility for free or 
reduced price lunch.
14 We also control for cohort fixed effects (  ) and school fixed effects (  ). Since 
our main independent variables are nonlinear functions of generated regressors, we adjust the standard 
errors by block bootstrapping at the school level.
15  
We also estimate models that allow the impacts to vary by terciles of a school’s estimated risk   of 
being rated Low-Performing or Recognized, which ranges from 0 to 1 because of the logit specification: 
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An ideal empirical strategy would randomly assign schools to test-based accountability, and then 
observe the resulting changes in test scores and long-run outcomes such as attainment and earnings. 
However, because of the rapid rollout of high-stakes testing in Texas and (later) nationwide, such an 
experiment is not possible, at least in the U.S. context. Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) compare students 
with similar prior scores before and after the implementation of test-based accountability in Chicago 
Public Schools.
16 While we do make use of school and subgroup aggregate data from earlier years to test 
for the possibility of differential pre-accountability trends, we do not have student-level data until 1994. 
In most states, accountability metrics are continuous but ratings are assigned based on sharp cutoffs. 
Several papers have exploited this policy feature to identify the impact of receiving a low school rating in 
                                                           
14 Additional covariates include special education, limited English proficiency, and a measure of ex ante rank within high school 
and cohort using the average of a students’ 8
th grade math and reading scores. This last measure addresses concerns that 
students in grade cohorts with lower average test scores may do better because they have a higher relative rank. 
15 Another possible approach is to employ a parametric correction following Murphy and Topel (1985). Estimates that use 
either a Murphy-Topel (1985) adjustment or no adjustment are very similar to the main results. 
16 Using data from Texas, Reback (2008) finds achievement gains for students who are more likely to contribute to a school’s 
accountability rating, compared to other students in the same school and year. By using students in the same school and grade 
cohort whose scores don’t count toward the rating as a control group, this identification strategy identifies relative changes and 
intentionally differences out the level effect of accountability pressure. 15 
 
a regression discontinuity (RD) framework (e.g. Figlio and Lucas 2004, Chiang 2009, Rockoff and Turner 
2010, Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber and Figlio 2013).
17  
Our results are valid causal estimates of the impact of accountability pressure only if changes in the 
predicted risk of receiving a rating are uncorrelated (conditional on covariates) with unobserved factors 
that also affect within-school, across-cohort variation in 10
th grade scores and long-run outcomes. The 
school fixed effects approach accounts for persistent differences across schools in unobserved factors 
such as parental education, wealth, or school effectiveness. However, if there are contemporaneous 
shocks that affect both the timing of a school’s predicted rating and the relative performance of the 
grade cohort on tests and long-run outcomes, our results will be biased.  
We test for the possibility of contemporaneous shocks in Appendix Table A4 by regressing a 
school’s predicted risk of being rated Low-Performing on the cohort characteristics in our prediction 
model, school and year fixed effects, and time-varying high school inputs such as principal turnover, 
teacher pay and teacher experience. Appendix Table A5 conducts a similar exercise using a linear trend 
interacted with overall and subgroup-specific pass rates going back to 1991, three years prior to the 
beginning of school accountability in Texas. The results in Appendix Tables A4 and A5 show that 
variation in accountability pressure across cohorts arises primarily from two sources – 1) changes in the 
ratings thresholds over time, as shown in Figure 1; and 2) fluctuations in the prior test scores and 
demographics of incoming grade cohorts.
18 While high school inputs and test score trends are strong 
predictors of accountability ratings across schools, they have little predictive power across cohorts 
within the same school, once we account for 8
th grade test scores and year fixed effects.
19 
                                                           
17 We do not pursue the RD approach, for three reasons. First, in Texas the consequences of receiving multiple low-performing 
ratings relative to just one were not well-defined, and depended on local discretion (TEA 1994, Haney 2000, Reback 2008). 
Second, since the high-stakes test is given only in 10
th grade in Texas, students have already finished their first year of high 
school before the school’s rating is known. Any important response to accountability pressure that occurs prior to the end of 
the first year of high school would not be measured by the RD approach. Third, the RD approach (at least in Texas) suffers from 
the limitation that the control group also faces significant pressure to improve student achievement. 
18 A third potential source of variation is fluctuation around the minimum size requirements – at least 10 percent of the cohort - 
for a subgroup to “count” toward a school’s accountability rating. Only 25 percent of students were in schools where the 
number of “accountable” subgroups changed across the five grade cohorts. Even within this minority of schools, relatively few 
faced a different predicted rating when the set of “accountable” subgroups changed. In Appendix Table A6, we find a very 
similar pattern of results when we restrict the sample to the remaining 75 percent of students in schools where the 
“accountable” subgroups did not change. 
19 The p-value on an F-test for the joint significance of time-varying high school characteristics is 0.300. The p-value on an F-test 
for the joint significance of all 16 interactions (pass rates overall and for black, Latino and poor students, for 1991 through 
1994) between a linear trend and pre-accountability pass rates is 0.482. Saturating the model in Appendix Table A5 with all 
possible trend interactions increases the R-squared from 0.28 to 0.35 (with p=0.000) without school fixed effects, but from 
0.618 to only 0.621 once school fixed effects are included. As a final check, in Appendix Table A7 we show that the main results 
of the paper are very similar when we include the full set of trend interactions directly in the estimating equation. 16 
 
A related possibility is that our estimates of accountability pressure are correlated with responses 
to accountability pressure in earlier grades (e.g. in feeder middle schools). This is a concern to the extent 
that covariates such as prior test scores and school fixed effects do not fully capture differences in 
student ability across cohorts, although the bias could be in either direction. We test for this possibility 
in Appendix Table A8 by including 7
th grade math scores as an outcome in our main estimating 
equations. Conditional on 8
th grade test scores, we find no statistically significant difference in the 7
th 
grade math achievement of students in grade cohorts that were at risk of receiving a Low-Performing 
rating. Finally, in Appendix Table A9 we show that our results are very similar when we exclude from our 
sample schools that display a clear trend in predicted ratings, in either direction.
20  
Another potential threat to the validity of our approach comes from measurement error in a 
school’s predicted rating. Specifically, if cohort fluctuations in 8
th grade test scores are driven by random 
shocks that cause group underperformance on the 8
th grade test, our results could be biased by mean 
reversion. We address the possibility of mean reversion in two ways. First, we take the predicted pass 
rates estimated in step 1 above, and average them across all five grade cohorts within a school. This 
gives us one set of predictions for all five cohorts, and isolates policy-induced changes in the pass rate 
thresholds over time as the only source of variation in predicted ratings.
21 This approach addresses 
mean reversion by eliminating any identifying variation that comes from cohort fluctuations in prior 
scores. Appendix Table A10 shows that our main results are generally very similar when we average 
predicted pass rates across cohorts. Second, in Appendix Table A11 we show that many of the main 
results of the paper still hold even without school fixed effects. In this case, mean reversion is not a 
concern because we are also making use of cross-school variation in predicted ratings. Relatedly, the 
pattern of results is very similar when we identify schools that face accountability pressure using only 8
th 
grade pass rates, rather than estimating risk directly.
22 
Ultimately, our identifying assumption is not directly testable. Yet it is worth pointing out that the 
omission of any factor that is positively correlated with 8
th grade test scores and long-run outcomes 
                                                           
20 Specifically, we exclude schools that never “switch back” between prob(LP)>0 and A or prob(R)>0 and A over the five year 
period. For example, a school with a five-year predicted ratings pattern of LP-A-A-A-A would be excluded by this rule, but a 
school with a pattern of LP-A-A-A-LP would not be excluded, because it “switched back” to LP in a later year.  
21 For example, we might find that the lowest-scoring subgroup in a school has a predicted pass rate of 35 percent, averaged 
across all five cohorts. This places them 5 percentage points below the threshold in 1996, right at the threshold in 1997, and 
five points above it in 1998 (see Figure 1). 
22 We calculate the share of students in an incoming high school cohort who passed the 8
th grade exam for all test-subgroup 
combinations (e.g. Latinos in reading, blacks in math, etc.) We then take the difference between the minimum 8
th grade test-
subgroup pass rate for each cohort and the threshold for an Acceptable rating when that cohort takes the TAAS two years later, 
in 10
th grade, and divide schools into bins based on their relative distance from the yearly threshold. In these specifications, 
shown in Appendix Table A12, we find a very similar patterns of results to Tables 2 through 3. 17 
 
biases the estimated impact of the risk of receiving a Low-Performing rating downward. If a particular 
grade cohort within a high school has relatively lower 8
th grade achievement, then all else equal that 
cohort is more likely to be rated Low-Performing. If the grade cohort also has a relatively lower level of 
parental engagement, and parental engagement improves long-run outcomes conditional on the 
covariates in our models, the estimated impact of being rated Low-Performing will be biased downward. 
V.  Results  
V.1  10
th Grade Test Scores and Other High School Outcomes 
Table 2 estimates the impact of accountability pressure on 10
th grade test scores and other 
outcomes in high school. Panels A and B present results from separate estimates of equations (1) and (2) 
respectively. Columns 1 through 3 show the impact of accountability pressure on 10
th grade math 
exams. Since pass rates on the 10
th grade math exam were almost always the key obstacle to a school’s 
achieving a higher rating, the impacts on these outcomes are a direct test of the influence of 
accountability pressure. For framing purposes, it is also important to note that we do not view increases 
in pass rates or overall achievement on the high stakes exams as necessarily measuring true learning. 
Rather, we consider them as a signal that schools were responding to their incentives. As stated earlier, 
these gains could reflect true increases in learning, teaching to the test, cheating, or a combination of 
these and other mechanisms.  
In Column 1, we see that 9
th graders in cohorts with a risk of being rated Low-Performing were 
about 0.7 percentage points more likely to pass the 10
th grade math exam in the following year, 
compared to similar students in the same school whose cohort was not at risk of being rated Low-
Performing. In Panel B, we see that the impact is more than twice as large (1.5 percentage points) for 
students who failed a math or reading exam in 8
th grade. Both impacts are statistically significant at the 
less than 1 percent level. In contrast, we find no impact of accountability pressure to achieve a 
Recognized rating. Column 2 shows the impact of accountability pressure on the probability that a 
student ever passes the 10
th grade math exit exam. Since students are allowed to retake the exit exam 
up to eight times, it is not surprising that the impacts on ever passing the exam are smaller.  
Column 3 shows the impact of accountability pressure on 10
th grade math scale scores. We find an 
overall increase of about 0.27 scale score points (equivalent to about 0.04 standard deviations) for 
students in schools that were at risk of receiving a Low-Performing rating. The impacts are larger for 
students with lower baseline scores (0.44 scale score points, or about 0.07 SDs), but are still significantly 
greater than zero for higher-scoring students (0.18 points, or about 0.025 SDs).  18 
 
We find negative and statistically significant impacts of accountability pressure on students with low 
baseline scores in schools that were close to achieving a Recognized rating. These students score about 
0.4 scale score points lower overall, and are 1.9 percentage points less likely to ever pass the 10
th grade 
math exit exam. We find no statistically significant impact of accountability pressure to achieve a 
Recognized rating on higher-scoring students. 
The results in the first three columns of Table 2 show that if schools were at risk of receiving a Low-
Performing rating, they responded by increasing math achievement, while schools that were close to 
achieving a Recognized rating did not.  However, another way that high schools can improve their rating 
is by manipulating the pool of “accountable” students. The outcome in Column 5 is an indicator that is 
equal to one if a student is receiving special education services in the 10
th grade year, conditional on not 
receiving special education services in 8
th grade. Special education students in Texas were allowed to 
take the TAAS, but their scores did not count toward the school’s accountability rating. They also were 
not required to pass the 10
th grade exam to graduate (Fuller 2000). Cullen and Reback (2006) find that 
schools in Texas during this period strategically classified students as eligible for special education 
services to keep them from lowering the school’s accountability rating. Panel B of Column 5 shows 
strong evidence of strategic special education classification in schools that had a chance to achieve a 
Recognized rating. Low-scoring students in these schools are 2.4 percentage points more likely to be 
newly designated as eligible for special education, an increase of over 100 percent relative to the 
baseline mean.  We also find a smaller (0.5 percentage points) but still highly significant decrease in 
special education classification for high scoring students.  
Column 6 shows results for high school graduation within 8 years of the student’s first time entering 
9
th grade. We find an overall increase in high school graduation of about 1 percentage point in schools 
that face pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating. We also find a concomitant decline in high school 
graduation in schools that face pressure to achieve a Recognized rating. Finally, Column 7 shows results 
for total math credits accumulated in four state-standardized high school math courses – Algebra I, 
Geometry, Algebra II and Pre-Calculus. We find an increase of about 0.06 math course credits in schools 
that face pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating. We also find a decline of about 0.10 math course 
credits for students with low baseline scores in schools that were close to achieving a Recognized rating. 
Both estimates are statistically significant at the less than 1 percent level. 
In sum, we find a very different pattern of responses to accountability pressure along different 
margins. Schools that were at risk of receiving a Low-Performing rating responded by increasing the 
math scores of all students, with particularly large gains for students who had previously failed an 8
th 19 
 
grade exam. These students also had higher reading scores, were more likely to graduate from high 
school, and accumulated significantly more math credits. In Appendix Table A13, which contains results 
for a number of additional high school outcomes, we show that these increases in math credits extend 
beyond the requirements of the 10
th grade math exit exam, to upper level coursework such as Algebra II 
and Pre-Calculus.
23  
On the other hand, schools that were close to achieving a Recognized rating responded not by 
improving math achievement, but by classifying more low-scoring students as eligible for special 
education and thus excluded from the “accountable” pool of test-takers. Our finding of a decrease in 
math pass rates (1.9 percentage points, Column 2, Panel B) combined with a borderline statistically 
significant increase in high school graduation (1.3 percentage points, Column 6, Panel B) makes sense in 
this light - special education students were not required to take the 10
th grade exit exams to graduate, 
and thus did not have to learn as much math to make it through high school. This is also reflected in the 
decline in math course credit accumulation found in Panel B of Column 7. Overall, it appears that 
schools responded to pressure to achieve a Recognized rating in part by exempting marginal low-scoring 
students from the normal high school graduation requirements.
24 
 
V.2  Long-Run Outcomes - Postsecondary Attainment and Earnings 
Table 3 presents results for the long-run impact of accountability pressure on postsecondary 
attainment and labor market earnings. As a reminder, each of these outcomes is measured for the 
universe of public school students in Texas, even if they transferred or left high school altogether prior 
to graduation. We measure college attendance within an eight year window following the first time a 
student enters 9
th grade, and we can measure degree receipt through age 25 even for the youngest 
cohort of students.  
Columns 1 through 3 show results for postsecondary attainment. We find that 9
th graders in cohorts 
with a risk of being rated Low-Performing were about 1 percentage points more likely to attend college. 
Column 2 shows that the increase is concentrated entirely among four-year colleges. In column 3 we 
                                                           
23 We find small but statistically significant increases in reading scores, and no impact on writing scores. We also find small but 
statistically significant declines in grade retention, transfers to other regular public schools, and transfers to alternative schools 
for students with behavior problems – see Appendix Table A13 for details. While past work has found that schools respond to 
accountability pressure by strategically retaining students, schools in Texas that are trying to avoid a Low-Performing rating 
have little incentive to retain students since the passing standard rises by 5 percentage points each year. 
24 This pattern of increases in special education classification is large enough to be readily apparent in descriptive statistics by 
school rating. The share of special education students in schools that received a Recognized rating was just over 12 percent, 
which is actually higher than the share of special education students in schools that received a Low-Performing rating (11 
percent). 20 
 
find a small but highly significant increase (0.4 percentage points, p<0.01) in bachelor’s degree receipt. 
Like the test score results in Table 2, the increase in postsecondary attendance and degree completion is 
larger for students who previously failed an 8
th grade exam. Increases in postsecondary attainment are 
proportionally much larger for lower-scoring students, who are about 14 percent more likely to attend a 
four-year college and 12 percent more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree. Nonetheless, we also find 
small increases in attainment for higher scoring students.
25 
We find small and statistically insignificant negative impacts on attainment for schools that face 
pressure to achieve a Recognized rating. However, the impacts for low-scoring students are very large 
and negative. Students who previously failed an 8
th grade exam are 2.8 percentage points less likely to 
attend a four-year college and 1.3 percentage points less likely to earn a BA when they are in grade 
cohorts that are close to achieving a Recognized rating.  
Columns 4 through 6 present results for annual earnings in the 9
th, 10
th and 11
th calendar years after 
the first time a student entered 9
th grade. Hereafter we refer to these earnings as occurring in the age 
23, 24 and 25 years. Column 7 includes cumulative earnings over the entire three year period, and in 
Column 8 the outcome is an indicator for being “idle”, defined as having zero positive earnings and 
never being enrolled in school at any point over the age 19-25 period. For 9
th graders in cohorts with a 
risk of being rated Low-Performing, we find small increases in annual earnings at ages 23 through 25 of 
around $150, or around 1 percent of the baseline mean in each year.
26 The estimates for each year are 
marginally statistically significant (all three at the 10 percent level, and one at the five percent level), 
and the estimates for the combined three-year period in Column 6 are statistically significant at the five 
percent level. Like the results for postsecondary attainment, the impacts are larger for students with 
lower baseline achievement (about 1.4 percent of the baseline mean for earnings at age 25). 
In contrast, we find no overall impact on labor market earnings of accountability pressure to achieve 
a Recognized rating, with statistically significant and large declines in earnings for low-achieving students 
                                                           
25 Beginning with the graduating class of 1998, Texas high school students who were ranked in the top 10 percent of their class 
were automatically admitted to all public universities in the state. Despite the impact that the Texas Top 10 percent law may 
have had on college enrollment in the state, it is unlikely to affect our results, for three reasons. First, we control for class rank 
of prior test scores directly in our main specifications, and we find no difference when we allow for nonlinear functions of class 
rank or for a different impact in the top decile. Second, our results are strongest for students who previously failed an 8
th grade 
exam, and very few (less than 7 percent) of these students subsequently end up in the top 10 percent of their class. Third, the 
law affects all five of the cohorts in our sample (first time 9
th graders in 1995 would graduate from high school in 1999), and our 
identification strategy hinges on across-cohort differences in accountability pressure. It is unlikely that the Texas Top 10 percent 
law is somehow differentially applicable to students in grade cohorts within a school that are more likely to be rated Low-
Performing. 
26 We find very similar results when we estimate impacts on log earnings. Our results are somewhat larger when we exclude 
students with zero earnings from the calculation, or when we exclude students who are enrolled in a postsecondary institution 
during that same year. 21 
 
in these schools. Students who previously failed an 8
th grade exam earned about than $700 less at age 
25 when they attended schools that were close to achieving a Recognized rating.  
In Column 8, we find no impact of accountability pressure on the probability of being “idle” between 
the ages of 19 and 25 for any students. The standard errors are sufficiently small that we can rule out 
differences of more than one percentage point in most cases.
27 Since our data only cover postsecondary 
attendance and employment in the state of Texas, students could potentially have college attendance 
and labor market earnings in other states. Our estimates would be biased if accountability pressure 
increases out-of-state migration, particularly if out-of-state migrants are more likely to attend and 
graduate from college and have higher earnings. However, it is unclear which way the bias would go. If 
the students who are induced by accountability pressure to attend four-year colleges and obtain BAs are 
more likely to move out of state after college, or if their earnings are low because they just graduated, 
the results would be biased downward. On the other hand, if accountability pressure makes students 
more likely to attend college out-of-state and stay there, our results may be biased upward. In Appendix 
Tables A14 and A15, we find that our results are robust to imputing missing earnings values and to 
allowing the impacts to vary for schools that send large shares of students out-of-state.
28 
Ideally we would measure labor market earnings beyond age 30, when nearly all schooling is 
complete and earnings are more stable (e.g. Haider and Solon 2006). Measuring earnings at age 25 is 
less than ideal, particularly since accountability pressure also appears to affect postsecondary 
attendance and persistence. To try to understand how the attainment and earnings results fit together, 
we estimate equation (1) for three mutually exclusive outcomes at ages 19 through 25 – (1) enrolled in 
any college; (2) earnings, excluding students with zero earnings or who are enrolled in college 
(regardless of their earnings); and (3) “idle” – defined as zero earnings and not enrolled in college. 
Appendix Table A16 shows three important findings from this exercise. First, the impact of 
accountability pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating on labor market earnings for students who are 
not enrolled in school is positive and statistically significant in every year from age 20 to age 25. Second, 
the impact on postsecondary enrollment becomes very small around age 24 (around 0.2 percentage 
                                                           
27 We also find no impacts on other measures of labor force participation, such as an indicator for zero earnings at ages 19-25, 
or indicators for idle / zero earnings in individual years between ages 19 and 25. 
28 In Appendix Table A14 we impute mean earnings by prior achievement and school type for students who are not currently 
enrolled in school and have zero reported earnings. We test the sensitivity of the results to imputation by adding and 
subtracting one standard deviation. We find that the results for schools on the Low-Performing margin are robust to adding or 
subtracting a standard deviation of earnings for missing values. However, the results for schools on the Recognized margin are 
much more sensitive to imputation. In Appendix Table A15 we show that our results are actually slightly larger when we 
exclude schools that send more than 10 percent of graduates to out-of-state colleges (the TSP data include a match of the 
graduating classes of 2008 and 2009 to the National Student Clearinghouse, which includes out-of-state enrollment). Finally, in 
results not reported, we also find no difference in impacts for schools that are close to the Texas border.  22 
 
points). Moreover, overall rates of college attendance drop sharply around age 23, with fewer than 10 
percent of all students still enrolled in college at age 25. Among low-scoring students, only 35 percent 
ever enroll in any college and only 10 percent ever enroll in a four-year college. Taken together, the 
evidence suggests that accountability pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating has an impact on 
earnings independent of its impact on postsecondary attainment. Finally, we note a statistically 
significant increase in the probability of being “idle” beginning at age 23 for students in schools that face 
pressure to achieve a Recognized rating. While not shown, these increases are concentrated among low-
scoring students. 
 
V.3  Variation by school risk and evidence on changes in inputs 
Table 4 shows results for the main outcomes of the paper for estimates of equation (3), where we 
allow the impacts to vary by terciles of the school’s predicted accountability rating. In general, we find 
slightly larger impacts for schools that are more likely to receive a Low-Performing rating. But the 
differences are relatively small and we are never able to reject equality across categories. We also find 
that the overall negative impacts in schools that were close to achieving a Recognized rating are 
relatively constant across categories of predicted risk.  
A strict interpretation of the predicted ratings might imply that some schools would not respond to 
pressure, because they estimate that they are almost certain to receive a Low-Performing rating. 
However, administrators and teachers in these schools were likely to be quite concerned about job 
security. Staff could potentially be fired for lack of effort, or conversely could be retained if some 
progress toward goals was being made. Reback, Rockoff and Schwartz (2011) find that teachers in 
schools that were well below the AYP margin were still significantly more likely to report that they were 
“concerned about job security due to student performance”, relative to schools that were projected to 
make AYP or be close to the margin.  
The lowest-performing schools were often targeted with significant external resources such as 
improvement efforts from the district office, focused remediation outside of school hours, and external 
funding (e.g. Scheurich, Skrla and Johnson 2000, Evers and Walberg 2002, Lemons, Luschei and Siskin 
2004). Craig, Imberman and Perdue (2013) find that school districts in Texas allocate additional funds for 
instruction to schools that receive lower accountability ratings. While the TSP data provide very limited 
information on staffing, we are able to measure the total number of teacher full-time equivalents (FTEs) 
by school and year. We also know broad categories of classrooms to which teachers are assigned. 
Appendix Figure A3 presents estimates of the impact of accountability pressure on the allocation of 23 
 
regular classroom and remedial classroom teacher FTEs, using the setup in equations (1) and (3). We 
find some evidence that schools respond to the risk of being rated Low-Performing by increasing 
staffing, particular in remedial classrooms. This is consistent with studies of accountability pressure in 
Texas and elsewhere that find increases in instructional time and resources devoted to low-performing 
students (e.g. Evers and Walberg 2002, Lemons, Luschei and Siskin 2004, Hamilton et al 2007, Rouse, 
Hannaway, Goldhaber and Figlio 2013). However, we are limited in this exercise by our inability to 
match individual teachers to subjects or grades, and by the possibility of spillover to adjacent grade 
cohorts.  
One less than ideal feature of our empirical strategy is that we are sometimes comparing students 
who are only one or two grades apart in the same school. If accountability pressure causes schools to 
shift resources toward some students at the expense of others (e.g. Reback 2008), comparisons across 
cohorts may be problematic. In Appendix Tables A17 and A18 we therefore restrict our analysis to 1) 
non-consecutive cohorts (i.e. 1995, 1997 and 1999) and 2) non-overlapping cohorts (i.e. 1995 and 1999). 
In the latter case, students who progressed through high school “on time” and in four years would never 
be in the building together. Our results are robust to these sample restrictions. 
 
V.4  Is the impact of accountability pressure greater for targeted subgroups? 
As we discussed in Section III, the Texas accountability system created strong incentives for schools 
to focus on low-scoring students in targeted subgroups. We investigate the impact of accountability 
pressure on targeted subgroups by estimating: 
 
            [  (  )      ]                 [  ( )      ]                                                            ( ) 
 
This setup modifies equation (1) in three ways. First, we augment the X vector with eight race 
(white or other vs. black or Latino) by poverty by prior test score (failed either 8
th grade exam or passed 
both) indicators. Second, we include school-by-cohort fixed effects, which difference out the level 
impact of accountability pressure and restrict our identifying variation to changes in the distribution of 
outcomes across cohorts. Third, we interact the accountability pressure treatment indicators with 
indicators for the most “targeted” group – poor minority student with low baseline test scores. This 
specification asks whether the difference in outcomes between targeted subgroups and all other 
students in the same grade cohort is greater in a year when the school faces accountability pressure. We 24 
 
also restrict the analysis sample to schools that have enough poor and/or minority students to meet the 
minimum size requirements described in Section III.  
The results for the key outcomes in the paper are in Table 5. In Columns 1 and 2, we see that gains 
in 10
th grade math for poor, low-scoring minorities are significantly greater relative to all other students 
in grade cohorts that are at risk of receiving a Low-Performing rating. We also find statistically significant 
relative gains in four-year college attendance, BA receipt and earnings at age 25 for poor, low-scoring 
minority students. These results confirm that the overall gains shown in Tables 2 and 3 from 
accountability pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating are concentrated among poor minority 
students with low levels of baseline achievement. Because school ratings are assigned based on the 
lowest-scoring subgroup and indicator, schools under accountability pressure had strong incentives to 
target these particular students. In contrast, we find no relative change in the outcomes of targeted 
subgroups for schools that face pressure to achieve a Recognized rating.  
VI.  Discussion and Conclusion 
We find that accountability pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating leads to increases in labor 
market earnings at age 25 of around 1 percent. By comparison, Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2012) 
find that having a teacher in grades 3 through 8 with 1 SD higher “value-added” also increases earnings 
at age 25 by about 1 percent. Chetty et al (2011) also find that students who are randomly assigned to a 
kindergarten classroom that is 1 SD higher quality earn nearly 3 percent more at age 27. Our results also 
line up fairly well with the existing literature on the connection between test score gains and labor 
market earnings. Neal and Johnson (1996) estimate that high school-age youth who score 0.1 SD higher 
on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) have 2 percent higher earnings at ages 26-29. Similarly, 
Currie and Thomas (2001) and Chetty et al (2011) find cross-sectional relationships between test scores 
at age 5-7 and adult earnings that are similar in size to our results for high school students.  
One possible explanation for the long-run impacts is that passing the math exit exam at a higher rate 
led to mechanical increases in high school graduation, which increased earnings through the 
“sheepskin” effect of having a high school diploma. Martorell and Clark (2010) use data on students who 
barely passed exit exams in two states (including Texas) to estimate the signaling value of a high school 
diploma, and find that the diploma has little or no impact on earnings for students with similar 10
th 
grade test scores. Moreover, low-scoring students in schools that were close to achieving a Recognized 
rating were actually more likely to graduate from high school despite experiencing significant declines in 25 
 
earnings (Table 2, Panel B, Column 6). Thus, we conclude that “sheepskin” effects of acquiring a high 
school diploma are unlikely to explain our results. 
A second possible mechanism is that accountability pressure affected students’ knowledge of 
mathematics, which in turn affected labor market earnings. Accountability pressure could have caused 
students to learn more math in two ways – 1) changes in class time and instructional resources devoted 
to math instruction, and 2) changes in students’ later course-taking patterns, due either to increases in 
passing the exit exam “on time” or to exemption from test-taking requirements. Using cross-state 
variation in the timing of high school graduation requirements, Goodman (2012) finds that an additional 
year of math coursework increases annual earnings by between 4 and 8 percent, with larger impacts for 
students who attend schools with high shares of nonwhites, and who have relatively low levels of skill. 
Levine and Zimmerman (1995) and Rose and Betts (2004) also find that additional mathematics 
coursework in high school is associated with increases in labor market earnings. Cortes, Goodman and 
Nomi (2013) find increases in high school graduation and college attendance for students who are 
assigned to a “double dose” Algebra I class in 9
th grade. While the impacts we find on math course credit 
accumulation in Table 2 are broadly consistent with this story, the evidence for increased math 
knowledge as a causal mechanism is only speculative. 
It is also possible that test score gains from accountability pressure could reflect gains in student 
motivation, perseverance or other “non-cognitive” skills. Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua (2007) argue that 
unlike cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills remain malleable through adolescence. Jackson (2012) finds 
evidence that teachers have important influences on non-cognitive skills that lead to increased 
attainment and earnings later in life. We have no direct evidence on the impact of accountability 
pressure on non-cognitive skills. 
In Appendix Tables A19 through A21 we examine heterogeneous treatment effects by gender, 
limited English proficiency (LEP), and urbanicity.
29 For schools that face pressure to avoid a Low-
Performing rating, we find very similar test score impacts by gender, but larger impacts on 
postsecondary attainment and earnings for males. We also find somewhat larger long-run impacts for 
LEP students, though we cannot reject equality across categories. Finally, we find that the negative long-
run impacts in schools that face pressure to achieve a Recognized rating are concentrated in urban 
areas. While we do not report Appendix results by race and poverty, the targeted subgroup results in 
                                                           
29 For urbanicity, we interact the main treatment indicators from equation (1) with an indicator variable that is equal to one if a 
student attends school in one of the six large urban districts in Texas (Houston, Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio and El 
Paso). 26 
 
Table 5 show that the impacts of accountability pressure to avoid a Low-Performing rating are larger for 
poor and minority students with low baseline test scores. 
Overall, we find that the long-run impact of accountability pressure in Texas high schools was very 
different for schools along different margins. Overall math achievement increased in schools that were 
at risk of receiving a Low-Performing rating, with larger gains for students with low baseline 
achievement. Later in life, these students were more likely to attend and graduate from a four-year 
college, and they had higher earnings at age 25. These long-run impacts are corroborated by gains in 
high school graduation and increased accumulation of math credits, including credits in advanced 
subjects such as Algebra II and Pre-Calculus, which the 10
th grade exit exam does not cover.  
On the other hand, schools that were close to achieving a Recognized rating responded not by 
improving math achievement, but by classifying more low-scoring students as eligible for special 
education and thus exempt from the “accountable” pool of test-takers. Low-scoring students in these 
schools also accumulated fewer high school math credits. Such changes in high school experiences may 
have played some role in the large decline in the postsecondary attainment and earnings of these 
students later in life. Why do schools on the margin of being rated Low-Performing not also respond 
with strategic exemptions? One possibility is that they enroll too many low-achieving students to meet 
rising passing standards purely through gaming behavior.  
Since accountability policy in Texas was in many ways the template for No Child Left Behind, our 
findings may have broad applicability to the similarly structured accountability regimes that were rolled 
out later in other states. However, many states (including Texas itself) have changed their rating systems 
over time, both by incorporating test score growth models and by limiting the scope for strategic 
behavior such as special education exemptions. At least in our setting, school accountability was more 
effective at ensuring a minimum standard of performance than improving performance at a higher level. 
However, our results are specific to a particular time period, state and grade level. Moreover, our 
approach is not designed to measure the impacts of long-run, structural changes that schools make in 
response to accountability pressure. Our findings provide an estimate of the net impact of schools’ 
responses to test pressure along a variety of margins, including strategic student exemption, focusing on 
tested subjects, teaching to the test, and manipulating the eligible test-taking pool. Our findings do not 
imply that these strategic responses do not occur, nor do they imply that school accountability in Texas 
was optimally designed (Neal, 2013). Improving the design of the next generation of school 
accountability policies is an important problem for future work.  
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Figure 1 
 
Notes: The figure above shows time trends in the share of students in Texas who pass the 8
th and 10
th grade exams 
in math and reading. Students are assigned to cohorts based on the first time they enter 9
th grade.  
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Overall
Black Latino FRPL Passed both 8th 
Grade Exams
Failed an 8th 
Grade Exam
8th grade covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
White / Other 0.52 0.20 0.64 0.33
Black 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.21
Latino 0.34 0.61 0.27 0.46
Free Lunch 0.38 0.54 0.68 0.29 0.55
Passed 8th math (TLI>=70) 0.67 0.48 0.56 0.53
Passed 8th reading (TLI>=70) 0.79 0.66 0.69 0.66
High school outcomes
10th grade scale score - math 78.2 72.6 75.6 74.6 83.2 66.3
Passed 10th math "on time" 0.76 0.59 0.67 0.64 0.90 0.40
Ever Passed 10th math 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.72 0.92 0.62
Passed 10th reading "on time" 0.88 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.95 0.51
Special Ed in 10th, but not in 8th 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Total Math Credits 1.93 1.78 1.73 1.65 2.29 1.33
Graduated from high school 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.82 0.59
Later Outcomes
Attended any college 0.54 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.65 0.35
Attended 4 year college 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.39 0.10
BA degree 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.05
Annual Earnings, Age 25 $17,683 $13,605 $16,092 $14,580 $19,818 $14,019
Idle, Ages 19 to 25 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.15
Sample Size 887,713 121,508 302,720 339,279 560,872 326,841
By Student Race / SES By 8th Grade Math Score
Notes: The sample consists of five cohorts of first-time rising 9th graders in public high schools in Texas, from years 1995 
to 1999. Postsecondary attendance data  include all public institutions and, from 2003 onward, all not-for-profit 
institutions in the state of Texas. Earnings data are drawn from quarterly unemployment insurance records from the state 
of Texas. Column 6 shows students who received a passing score on both the 8th grade math and reading exams. Column 7 
shows descriptive statistics for students who failed either exam. Students who are first time 9th graders in year T and who 
pass a 10th grade exam in year T+1 are considered to have passed "on time". Math credits are defined as the sum of 
indicators for passing Algebra I, Geometry, Algebra II and Pre-calculus, for a total maximum value of four. "Idle" is 
defined as having zero recorded earnings and no postsecondary enrollment.
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics35 
 
 
   
Table 2: Impact of Accountability Pressure on High School Outcomes
Passed Test 
"On Time"
Ever 
Passed
Scale 
Score
Special Ed. 
In 10th
Graduated 
High School
Total Math 
Credits
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Risk of Low Performing Rating 0.007** 0.004 0.265** -0.001 0.009** 0.060**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.080] [0.001] [0.002] [0.015]
Risk of Recognized Rating -0.001 -0.008 -0.238 0.002 -0.009* 0.011
[0.003] [0.005] [0.127] [0.001] [0.004] [0.016]
Panel B
Risk of Low Performing Rating
             Failed an 8th grade exam 0.015** 0.008* 0.435** -0.003** 0.010** 0.073**
[0.006] [0.004] [0.125] [0.001] [0.003] [0.016]
             Passed 8th grade exams 0.004 0.002 0.181* 0.000 0.009** 0.051**
[0.002] [0.004] [0.075] [0.000] [0.002] [0.017]
Risk of Recognized Rating
             Failed an 8th grade exam -0.008 -0.019** -0.395* 0.024** 0.013 -0.106**
[0.009] [0.007] [0.173] [0.004] [0.007] [0.023]
             Passed 8th grade exams -0.007 -0.005 -0.215 -0.005** -0.016** 0.044*
[0.003] [0.006] [0.121] [0.001] [0.004] [0.018]
Sample Size 697,728 887,713 697,728 887,713 887,713 887,713
10th Grade Math Non-Test High School Outcomes
Notes: Within Panels A and B, each column is a single regression of the indicated outcome on the set of variables from equations (1) 
(Panel A) or (2) (Panel B) in the paper, which includes controls for cubics in 8th grade math and reading scores, dummies for male, 
black, hispanic, and free/reduced price lunch, each student's percentile rank on the 8th grade exams within their incoming 9th grade 
cohort, year fixed effects, and school fixed effects. Standard errors are block boostrapped at the school level. Each coefficient gives 
the impact of being in a grade cohort that has a positive estimated risk of being rated Low-Performing or Recognized, for either all 
students in the grade cohort (Panel A) or students who failed one / passed both 8th grade exams (Panel B). The reference category is 
grade cohorts for whom the estimated risk of receiving an Acceptable rating rounds up to 100 percent. See the text for details on the 
construction of the ratings prediction. Students who are first time 9th graders in year T and who pass the 10th grade math exam in 
year T+1 are considered to have passed "on time". The outcome is Column 4 is the share of students who are classified as eligible to 
receive special education services in 10th grade, conditional on not having been eligible in 8th grade. High school graduation is 
defined within an 8 year window beginning in the year a student first enters 9th grade. Math credits are defined as the sum of 
indicators for passing Algebra I, Geometry, Algebra II and Pre-calculus, for a total maximum value of four. * = sig. at 5% level; ** = sig. at 
1% level or less.36 
 
 
   
Table 3: Impact of Accountability Pressure on Long-Run Outcomes
Idle
Attend Any 
College
Attend 4 Yr 
College
BA 
Degree Age 23 Age 24 Age 25 Age 23-25 Age 19-25
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk of Low Performing Rating 0.011** 0.012** 0.0043** 140* 148 172 459* -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.0011] [63] [77] [97] [221] [0.002]
Risk of Recognized Rating -0.006 -0.005 -0.0041 48 -50 -121 -123 0.004
[0.004] [0.004] [0.0037] [129] [198] [198] [508] [0.003]
Panel B
Risk of Low Performing Rating
             Failed an 8th grade exam 0.009* 0.014** 0.0060** 148 176* 194* 518* -0.001
[0.004] [0.002] [0.0016] [78] [75] [89] [203] [0.002]
             Passed 8th grade exams 0.013** 0.010** 0.0032* 133 127 153 412 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.0015] [75] [78] [99] [275] [0.002]
Risk of Recognized Rating
             Failed an 8th grade exam 0.002 -0.028** -0.0129** -135 -379 -707** -1,221** 0.003
[0.007] [0.006] [0.0045] [157] [211] [212] [451] [0.004]
             Passed 8th grade exams -0.009* 0.002 -0.0018 101 43 49 193 0.004
[0.004] [0.005] [0.0039] [129] [181] [155] [455] [0.003]
Sample Size 887,713 887,713 887,713 887,713 887,713 887,713 887,713 887,713 887,713
Postsecondary Outcomes Annual Earnings
Notes: Within Panels A and B, each column is a single regression of the indicated outcome on the set of variables from equations (1) (Panel A) or 
(2) (Panel B) in the paper, which includes controls for cubics in 8th grade math and reading scores, dummies for male, black, hispanic, and 
free/reduced price lunch, each student's percentile rank on the 8th grade exams within their incoming 9th grade cohort, year fixed effects, and 
school fixed effects. Standard errors are block boostrapped at the school level. Each coefficient gives the impact of being in a grade cohort that 
has a positive estimated risk of being rated Low-Performing or Recognized, for either all students in the grade cohort (Panel A) or students who 
failed one / passed both 8th grade exams (Panel B). The reference category is grade cohorts for whom the estimated risk of receiving an 
Acceptable rating rounds up to 100 percent. See the text for details on the construction of the ratings prediction. College attendance outcomes 
are measured within an 8 year time window beginning with the student's first-time 9th grade cohort, and measure attendance at any public 
(and after 2003, any private) institution in the state of Texas. The outcomes in Columns 4 through 6 are annual earnings in the 9th through 11th 
years after the first time a student enters 9th grade (which we refer to as the age 23 to 25 years), including students with zero reported 
earnings. Column 7 gives total earnings over the age 23-25 period.  Column 8 is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the student has zero 
reported earnings and no postsecondary enrollment over the age 19-25 period. * = sig. at 5% level; ** = sig. at 1% level or less.37 
 
 
   
Table 4: Impact of Accountability Pressure, by Terciles of Predicted Rating
Earnings
Risk of Low-Performing Rating Passed Test
Scale 
Score
Ever 
Attend BA Age 25
School Predicted Rating is in: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
     Bottom Third 0.006* 0.228** 0.011** 0.0041** 141
[0.003] [0.076] [0.002] [0.0011] [89]
     Middle Third 0.014* 0.490** 0.011** 0.0047* 233
[0.006] [0.157] [0.003] [0.0020] [130]
     Top Third 0.010* 0.308 0.020** 0.0054** 326*
[0.005] [0.171] [0.002] [0.0019] [143]
Risk of Recognized Rating
School Predicted Rating is in:
     Bottom Third -0.003 -0.085 -0.003 -0.0026 -168
[0.004] [0.119] [0.004] [0.0034] [204]
     Middle Third -0.011* -0.441* -0.009 -0.0061 -336
[0.005] [0.197] [0.007] [0.0046] [267]
     Top Third -0.011* -0.478** -0.008 -0.0065 51
[0.005] [0.161] [0.005] [0.0045] [226]
Sample Size 697,728 697,728 887,713 887,713 887,713
10th Grade Math Four Year College
Notes: Each column is a single regression of the indicated outcome on the  variables from equation (3) in the paper, which 
includes controls for cubics in 8th grade math and reading scores, dummies for male, black, hispanic, and free/reduced 
lunch, each student's percentile rank on the 8th grade exams within their incoming 9th grade cohort, year fixed effects, 
and school fixed effects. Standard errors are block boostrapped at the school level. Each coefficient gives the impact of 
being in a cohort that has a positive estimated risk of being rated either Low-Performing or Recognized. The estimates are 
also allowed to vary by terciles (low/middle/high) of the ratings prediction. The reference category is grade cohorts for 
whom the estimated risk of receiving an Acceptable rating rounds up to 100 percent. See the text for details on the 
construction of the ratings prediction.  Students who are first time 9th graders in year T and who pass the 10th grade math 
exam in year T+1 are considered to have passed "on time". College attendance outcomes are measured within an 8 year 
time window beginning with the student's first-time 9th grade cohort, and measure attendance at any public (and after 
2003, any private) institution in the state of Texas. The outcome in Column 5 is annual earnings in the 11th year after the 
first time a student enters 9th grade (which we refer to as the age 25 year), including students with zero reported 
earnings. * = sig. at 5% level; ** = sig. at 1% level or less.38 
 
 
   
Table 5: Impact of Differential Accountability Pressure for Targeted Subgroups
Earnings
Passed Test
Scale 
Score
Ever 
Attend BA Age 25
Risk of Low-Performing Rating (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.011* 0.279* 0.012* 0.008** 579**
[0.005] [0.134] [0.005] [0.002] [141]
Risk of Recognized Rating
0.009 -0.370 -0.012 -0.006 -193
[0.020] [0.422] [0.012] [0.008] [586]
Sample Size 618,721 618,721 797,703 797,703 797,703
10th Grade Math Four Year College
Notes: Each column is a single regression of the indicated outcome on the set of variables from equation (4) in the paper, 
which includes controls for cubics in 8th grade math and reading scores, dummies for an exhaustive set of race 
(black/Latino vs. white/other) by poverty by prior test score (failed either or passed both 8th grade exams) categories, 
each student's percentile rank on the 8th grade exams within their incoming 9th grade cohort,  and school-by-year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are block boostrapped at the school level. Each coefficient gives the difference in outcomes 
between students in a targeted subgroup (i.e. poor black or Latino students with low 8th grade test scores) and all other 
students, within a grade cohort and school that has a positive estimated risk of being rated either Low-Performing or 
Recognized. TThe reference category is the difference between targeted subgroups and all other students in grade 
cohorts for whom the estimated risk of receiving an Acceptable rating rounds up to 100 percent. See the text for details 
on the construction of the ratings prediction.  Students who are first time 9th graders in year T and who pass the 10th 
grade math exam in year T+1 are considered to have passed "on time". College attendance outcomes are measured 
within an 8 year time window beginning with the student's first-time 9th grade cohort, and measure attendance at any 
public (and after 2003, any private) institution in the state of Texas. The outcome in Column 5 is annual earnings in the 
11th year after the first time a student enters 9th grade (which we refer to as the age 25 year), including students with 
zero reported earnings. * = sig. at 5% level; ** = sig. at 1% level or less.
Targeted Subgroup, Failed 8th 
Grade Exam
Targeted Subgroup, Failed 8th 
Grade Exam